Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Page 12392
1 Wednesday, 15 October 2014
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 — Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning to everyone in and around the
6 courtroom.
7 Mr. Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case IT-04-75-T, the Prosecutor versus Goran Hadzic.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
11 May we have the appearances, please, starting with the
12 Prosecution.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Good morning, Your Honours. Matthew Olmsted,
14 Douglas Stringer, our intern Nika Jurkovic, and, of course,
15 Thomas Laugel, our Case Manager.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
17 For the Defence, Mr. Zivanovic.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Defence of
19 Goran Hadzic, Zoran Zivanovic and Christopher Gosnell.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
21 The witness may be brought in.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Zivanovic.
24 WITNESS: VOJIN SUSA [Resumed]
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
Page 12393
1 Re-examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]
[...]
Page 12436
9 [The witness entered court]
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. Witness. Thank you for coming
11 to The Hague to assist the Tribunal.
12 First of all, do you hear me in a language you understand?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good day to you, too. Yes, I can
14 hear you well.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, could you state for the record your
16 name and your date of birth, please.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My name is Savo Strbac. I was born
18 on the 6th of October, 1949.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Strbac, you are about to make the solemn
20 declaration, by which witnesses commit themselves to tell the truth. By
21 doing so, you expose yourself to the penalties of perjury, should you
22 give false or untruthful information to this Tribunal.
23 Could I now ask you to read out the solemn declaration the court
24 usher will give to you.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
Page 12437
1 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 WITNESS: SAVO STRBAC
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
5 Mr. Gosnell, I take it it is your witness.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
7 May we please have 1D3652.1, Defence tab 34, on the screen. And
8 may I also request that a hard copy of the document be provided to the
9 witness and I have hard copies for Your Honours and the legal officer, if
10 you so desire.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Gosnell.
12 Examination by Mr. Gosnell:
13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Strbac.
14 A. Good day. After 9.00, it is day, so good day.
15 Q. Do you recognise the document that has just been handed to you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And what is that?
18 A. That's my statement and my signature on that statement.
19 Q. If we turn to page 2, paragraph 2, is there a correction that
20 you'd like to make to the first sentence?
21 A. Yes. There's a typo here. Instead of 1991, it should say 1990.
22 Q. And with this correction, is this statement accurate and true, to
23 the best of your recollection?
24 A. Yes, it is accurate and true.
25 Q. Does it reflect what you would say if you were questioned here on
Page 12438
1 the same matters?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I tender 1D3652.1 for admission,
4 along with the nine associated documents that were approved for admission
5 along with the statement by your decision of the 10th of October. And I
6 have a list or I could read them out, as would be more convenient for the
7 Registry.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: I think, Mr. Registrar, correct me if I'm wrong,
9 that the list would be the best way and you'll give numbers subsequently.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour. I have the numbers
11 on the list circulated by e-mail but I can assign a number to the
12 statement –
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay.
14 THE REGISTRAR: — which will be Exhibit D234.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gillett.
16 MR. GILLETT: I just noted a small number of other, what look to
17 be, typographical errors and so I wonder if we should MFI the statement
18 just to get these corrected. I can tell you where they appear to be.
19 In the paragraph after paragraph 12, it doesn't have a
20 paragraph number, that's — it's a minor issue. Paragraph 26, it refers
21 to the term “is witnesses.” I believe it is supposed to be “is
22 witnessed.”
23 In paragraph 48, it says “until there were prisoners left,” and I
24 believe it should read “until there were no prisoners left.” That seems
25 to logically follow.
Page 12439
1 And then in paragraph 59, there's a reference to “departure of
2 one civilians,” in the plural, which is unclear in its meaning, and so
3 perhaps that — and it may be clearer in the B/C/S version, I'm not sure.
4 So I'd suggest that it could be MFI pending those to be clarified.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
6 MR. GOSNELL: I agree with each of those being typos and there
7 are other typos, Mr. President. And I should perhaps clarify that this
8 English version is technically a Defence translation of the witness's
9 original language statement. We have requested an official translation
10 and that is the one that we would propose to be the final exhibit. In
11 the meantime, no objection to MFI'g this version.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: I indeed think it's appropriate to MFI the
13 document as long as we don't have the official translation which will be
14 uploaded, I hear. Thank you. So admitted and marked MFI'd.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D234, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Should I read the numbers of the associated
18 exhibits or would it better to provide a list?
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: To provide a list would be better, Mr. Gosnell.
20 Thank you.
21 MR. GOSNELL:
22 Q. Mr. Susa [sic], could I ask you please to turn to paragraph –
23 A. Strbac.
24 Q. Excuse me. Mr. Strbac, I apologise. Could I ask you please to
25 turn to paragraph 25 of your statement.
Page 12440
1 A. [In English] Okay.
2 Q. And you describe here the events at Miljevacki Plateau in June of
3 1992.
4 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
5 Q. And a exhumation of a mass grave. What happened to the corpses
6 that were disinterred, if you know?
7 A. A number of bodies were dug out and a large number was extracted
8 from the pit where they had been thrown. Two months after the event, the
9 bodies were taken out and that was done by the district court in Sibenik
10 under the observation of the UNPROFOR, the ICRC, and the monitoring
11 mission of the European community. After the extractions of the bodies,
12 the bodies were turned over to our side which identified them, but the
13 bodies were in such a far stage of decomposition and unrecognisable that
14 a number of them are still unidentified. They are in the cemetery under
15 our control and the control of the Croatian authorities.
16 Q. And did you receive any documentation about the state of the
17 bodies?
18 A. We did, I would say, receive all the necessary documentation.
19 Through the UNPROFOR, we received records of the exhumation from the pit
20 where the bodies had been thrown. Then on our side when the bodies had
21 been turned over to us, the bodies were examined by our pathologist, but
22 we also received the record made by a Croatian court accompanied by the
23 findings of their pathologists. So on our Serbian side we have complete
24 documentation including photographs that were made during the hand-over.
25 MR. GOSNELL: May we have 1D2350, please, which is Defence
Page 12441
1 tab 13.
2 Q. Are these some of the photographs to which you just referred that
3 were made during the hand-over?
4 A. Yes, yes. My organisation Veritas produced a publication in
5 which we singled out a number of mortal remains and these are the
6 photographs you've just shown me. The Veritas file contains all the
7 other photographs, and we have made the complete dossier available to the
8 Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal.
9 Q. And were the circumstances surrounding the massacre, including
10 the condition of the bodies, publicised? Did it become known?
11 MR. GILLETT: Objection, Your Honour. It's a leading question.
12 It could have been asked in an open way.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Overruled.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I said, we published this, and I
15 mentioned a moment ago the publication that we printed somewhere in
16 Chicago, a Serb emigre in Chicago helped us publish this, and I know that
17 the OTP has had it in their archives for at least 15 years. I know when
18 they came to us, I handed it over personally.
19 As far as the massacre is concerned, it's noteworthy that the
20 captured Serbs threw the bodies of the Serbs who had been killed into the
21 pit on orders of the Croatian army and police. Those captives, at least
22 some of them, were later killed. Others were exchanged. And those who
23 were exchanged told us what had happened and we also published that –
24 their statements in the same publication.
25 Last September, convictions were pronounced for two Croatian
Page 12442
1 soldiers who had killed one of the captive Serbs who were throwing the
2 Serb bodies into the pit. They were convicted by a Croatian court.
3 MR. GOSNELL:
4 Q. Did these events become known at the time in Krajina to the
5 public at large? And by “at the time,” I mean in 1992.
6 A. Well, it was known. There is a whole communication between the
7 authorities of Krajina and UNPROFOR who conveyed these messages to the
8 Croatian side. There was intensive pressure on the Croatian side to
9 exhume these mortal remains and get them out of the pit. Otherwise, it
10 would not have been done so speedily. It was done relatively quickly for
11 war time. It was within two months that the mortal remains were exhumed
12 and turned over to the Serbian side.
13 I also have to say that the Croats filmed this whole operation at
14 the Miljevac Plateau, including the killing of those soldiers, and out of
15 that video footage, they made a film that was rented out in video rentals
16 throughout Europe. It's one of the most horrible horror movies that I've
17 ever seen.
18 Q. And did that video become available in the Krajina region in
19 1992? Was it seen?
20 A. We did not get it in 1992 but we got it in 1993. I received it
21 in 1993 through some friends who live in Europe, and I still have it in
22 my archive. Nowadays you can find at least a part of that material on
23 Veritas's web page and certainly on YouTube but also here in the archive
24 of the OTP.
25 MR. GOSNELL: I tender this document, Mr. President.
Page 12443
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D244, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
4 Mr. Gosnell, I want to come back to Mr. Gillett's objection to
5 your question. I was probably a little bit too quick to overrule it. As
6 I see now you — that you qualified the incident in your question as a
7 massacre, and I take it that was, Mr. Gillett, the object of his
8 objection. But he is not listening.
9 MR. GOSNELL: Unless I'm very much mistaken, Mr. President, and I
10 may well be, and perhaps I should wait to hear what the Prosecutor has to
11 say as to the basis to the objection.
12 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President, for your observation and
13 the term “massacre” did jump out at me and I was somewhat slow in
14 responding and my objection then did come out following the question
15 about the publicisation of this document. I apologise again for raising
16 slowly and somewhat belatedly, but in relation to this exhibit, the
17 Prosecution is having difficulty –
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one minute, Mr. Gillett. Just for the
19 objection because that's what I came back to. Your objection was based
20 on the qualification “massacre”?
21 MR. GILLETT: The specific objection I made was after the
22 question relating to the publication and I understand that in the
23 witness's statement there is a reference to the word “massacre.” So
24 although the word did jump out at me, my objection is not specifically
25 related to that word, Your Honour.
Page 12444
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. So now we are — yes, Mr. Gosnell.
2 MR. GOSNELL: It's not just in the witness's statement, it's at
3 line 7 of page 50 which is exactly why I used that word in the next
4 question.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Line 7, page 50, you say.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Line 7, page 50, yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: But did you — you used it in a question before
8 that. That was the first time that the word was used, unless I'm wrong,
9 in –
10 MR. GOSNELL: I apologise. That's correct. It is after the
11 potentially leading question.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah. Okay. This being clarified and
13 Mr. Gosnell having understood that he has to be a little bit more
14 cautious about the qualification of incidents, Mr. Gosnell, we are now at
15 the stage of admitting this document. Do you have a problem with that?
16 MR. GILLETT: The Prosecution indeed does object to the admission
17 of this document on the basis that it is simply tu quoque evidence that,
18 as Your Honours are well aware, cannot constitute an excuse for crimes
19 within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The document discusses events
20 at Miljevac Plateau, crimes that ostensibly appear to have been committed
21 according to this documentation against Serbs, and the Defence simply
22 hasn't explained the relevance and has not provided a sufficient basis
23 for this to be admitted onto the record in these proceedings.
24 And I note, Your Honour, this affects a large number of documents
25 related — in fact, a considerable proportion of this witness's evidence
Page 12445
1 is pure and simple tu quoque evidence.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
3 MR. GOSNELL: Two points.
4 One, is the word “massacre” is actually used at paragraph 25 and
5 26 of the witness's statement. I just wanted to put that on the record.
6 Second point is this is not tu quoque. The purpose of adducing
7 this evidence is understand the nature of the fears of people, in
8 particular, at the time of the 1993 Maslenica attack which occurred six
9 months after the Miljevacki Plateau attack. There were consequences of
10 the Miljevacki — of the Maslenica attack that are directly relevant to
11 charges in the indictment and getting to the bottom of why that happened
12 is important. At the very least, it's important context.
13 MR. GILLETT: Well, if I could just add one word. Your Honours,
14 the witness's statement discusses these fears in detail of the Serb
15 population in the RSK. This document adds nothing to that except for
16 images and additional detail that is purely tu quoque evidence. And,
17 Your Honours, in relation to my learned friend's submission, a lot of
18 water passed under the bridge in between Miljevac and then Maslenica in
19 1993 at least six months later. Many events occurred and so it is a
20 somewhat tenuous connection to draw.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: The document is admitted and marked; Judge Hall
23 dissenting.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: So the document admitted and marked, and a number
Page 12446
1 will be assigned.
2 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Mr. Strbac, at paragraphs 29 and 30, you describe the attack on
4 Maslenica bridge and its environs, and you describe 10.000 Serb refugees
5 having fled those areas that were targeted or taken over by Croatian
6 forces and that 348 soldiers and civilians were killed on the Serb side
7 during this attack. And we don't need further details on that. It's in
8 your statement. But can you tell us over what period of time this attack
9 took place? How long did the fighting continue in relation to this
10 attack?
11 A. The attack began on 22nd January 1993, and the fighting went on
12 for the whole year of 1993 in the area of Ravni Kotar. It was covered
13 all by the operation called Maslenica. Croatian soldiers and members of
14 the Croatian special police raided that territory and Serbs were being
15 killed throughout that year, but, of course, most of them perished in the
16 first four or five days. I, as chairman of the commission for exchanges,
17 both of the living and the dead, later took over most of those bodies
18 from the Croatian side and counted them.
19 MR. GOSNELL: May we have 03146, which I believe should now have
20 a Defence exhibit number, if I'm not mistaken, since this is an
21 associated exhibit.
22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit D240.234, Your Honours.
23 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar. And that's
24 Defence tab 64.
25 Q. This is a document which is entitled: “Memo of the meeting held
Page 12447
1 on 27 May 1993,” under the letterhead “RSK government, State Committee
2 for Relations with UNPROFOR.” Were you a member of that committee?
3 A. Yes, in addition to the fact that by that time I was already
4 secretary of the government, I was also a member of the State Committee
5 of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for relations with UNPROFOR. And I
6 attended the meeting that produced this record, as can you see from the
7 content of the record.
8 MR. GOSNELL: If we can turn, please, to page 3.
9 Q. We see what appears to be the attachment to the cover letter,
10 which is the memo itself, memorialising the meeting that you just
11 referred to.
12 MR. GOSNELL: And I'd like, please, to go to page 10 in the
13 English and page 5 in the original.
14 Q. It says at the second-last paragraph in the English:
15 “To us, these are imperative issues that we cannot repudiate.
16 The ?prospect of living together in the RH after this bloody war is over,
17 which resulted in the third genocide in the last 75 years, gives us the
18 right to present these facts in the way we did.”
19 Now can you explain, Mr. Strbac, what is meant here by this
20 reference to “living together in the RH”?
21 A. Well, all these representatives of different international
22 organisations who were in the Republic of Serb Krajina, and most of them
23 were in Knin as it was the capital of the Republic of Serb Krajina were
24 telling us, Serbs, that we had to live in the Croat state with Croats and
25 our answer to them was that two are required for co-existence. The other
Page 12448
1 side has to be willing and ready as well. Since they had killed us, over
2 here, it says three genocides, the First World War, the Second World War,
3 and also what preceded this meeting, that was the Miljevacki Plateau and
4 Maslenica and Nos Kalik, and many other things that happened in 1991 and
5 that are not referred to in my statement. We were assuring them and this
6 document also says that this kind of co-existence is impossible in this
7 situation because the Croats basically did not want us. If they had
8 wanted us, they wouldn't have been persecuting us and killing us as they
9 did. So just like for marriage, it takes two for co-existence to work as
10 well.
11 Q. And just now in your answer you've twice used the expression
12 “co-existence.” What do you mean by co-existence?
13 A. Well, I have been using the word “suzivot,” and I don't know how
14 they've been interpreting that. Now I heard the word “koegzistencija.”
15 Now I don't know whether that's a mistake in the interpretation. I did
16 not mention the word “koegzistencija,” I just used “suzivot.”
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Co-existence, living
18 together.
19 MR. GOSNELL:
20 Q. Well, leaving aside the exact word used, can you help us
21 understand what these words mean and, more importantly, how you meant
22 them as they're set out in this document?
23 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, the witness has insisted that he used
24 the word “suzivot,” and so I think he should be asked about what he meant
25 by that word, “suzivot,” not two different words.
Page 12449
1 MR. GOSNELL:
2 Q. Can you explain, Mr. Witness — perhaps I could move to a
3 different question. What is the difference in meaning between these two
4 words, if you had to explain it?
5 A. Well, I don't see any substantive difference. I just wanted us
6 to stick to the term that we had used. I don't see any substantive
7 difference. Probably the content should be the same within these two
8 concepts the way I understand them. I tried to explain what “suzivot”
9 means. Before the war, in Tito's Yugoslavia we did have this “suzivot”
10 where we all lived together, all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia in
11 some brotherhood and unity, if I can put it that way. At least that's
12 how I felt. I don't know about others but that's how I felt.
13 I worked and lived among Croats, I worked as a judge, and I tried
14 all irrespective of ethnicity, and now all of a sudden, we were in a
15 position to be expelled from work. They asked me to sign some kind of
16 statements of loyalty to the new state. Many others were asked to do
17 even worse things. Yet others were not asked for anything. They were
18 simply kicked out of the police or other authorities or different
19 companies. I know that because I defended quite few of people as a
20 lawyer. There were different proceedings involved, disciplinary,
21 et cetera, so this is no longer any kind of life together or
22 co-existence. As I've said, both sides have to be willing and ready to
23 live together. The Croat people obviously as the majority people did not
24 feel that way because had they felt that way, they wouldn't have done
25 what they did to us.
Page 12450
1 Q. But in this document that's in front of us, are you using the
2 terms — I should first ask you is the word “suzivot” or “koegzistencija”
3 used in the original?
4 A. We used precisely that word “sazivot.” That is the Serbian
5 version of “suzivot.” So that would be the that.
6 Q. And were you expressing, by using this word, any view about where
7 people of a particular ethnicity could live?
8 A. Well, no. When I accepted to be secretary of the government in
9 the Bjegovic government, that was towards end of April 1993, that is to
10 say, after the Maslenica operation, of course, we did talk and we tried
11 to reach agreement. I did know about Bjegovic's programme and the
12 government programme. We had had enough of a war. We needed a life in
13 peace, to develop the economy. We did not want to expel anyone from the
14 Republic of the Serb Krajina; that is to say, that we wanted to create a
15 state of our own where, I mean, people could live, irrespective of
16 religious or ethnic affiliation.
17 Q. And this word “suzivot” and the agenda that you've just described
18 as being reflected in that word, did you express that and did your
19 colleagues on the state committee express that on other occasions to
20 UNPROFOR officials?
21 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, that is a leading question.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Gosnell.
23 MR. GOSNELL: I don't believe so.
24 MR. GILLETT: Well, Your Honours, the question contains the
25 suggested and hoped for answer. So it's, by definition, leading, and
Page 12451
1 there isn't a foundation in the lead-up of questions to put it in such a
2 narrowly leading way. It could have been asked in a broader way as to
3 whether it had been used on other occasions and then asked, with whom.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: I'll allow the question.
5 Please continue, Mr. Gosnell.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we were talking about
7 everyone and these were meetings that were held every day at all levels.
8 When I was present at some joint meetings with the prime minister, I
9 listened to how this was discussed. When we attended meetings of this
10 committee for relations with UNPROFOR, when I chaired meetings or when I
11 led delegations of the Republic of the Serb Krajina, I talked about that.
12 So once again “suzivot,” it pertained to two already separated states:
13 The Republic of the Serb Krajina that hadn't been internationally
14 recognised but obviously it was recognised as an entity because
15 resolutions were passed concerning it in the United Nations; on the other
16 hand, there was the Republic of Croatia that was a recognised state. We
17 were at war and we said that it was impossible for the Republic of
18 Serbian Krajina and Croatia to become one again. As for “suzivot” with
19 Croats and everybody else in the Republic of Serbian Krajina that was
20 never brought into question.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
22 be asked to slow down for the record and for interpretation. Thank you.
23 MR. GOSNELL:
24 Q. Mr. Strbac, could you please just slow down a little bit so that
25 the interpreters and transcribers can get your words down accurately
Page 12452
1 please.
2 MR. GOSNELL: Could we move now, please, to page 17 of the
3 English of this document. Page 8 of the B/C/S.
4 And can I go back and ask you now, Mr. Strbac, do you remember
5 that you did participate in formulating or writing this memo?
6 A. I believe that I did participate. It's hard to remember given
7 the time distance. But I am fully familiar with the content which means
8 that I took part in the preparations as well. Well, this happened every
9 day, these meetings. It was war time. This state committee, the
10 government, we were in permanent session, as we say, and it's not that
11 just two or three people got together and compiled a document and handed
12 it over to these officials from UNPROFOR. Rather, quite simply this was
13 discussed every day, day in, day out, for months, and this is the result
14 of all of these discussions and debates.
15 Q. But you say that “this was discussed every day, day in, day out,
16 for months.” Were you referring to the state committee's contacts with
17 UNPROFOR?
18 A. I'm also referring to the state organs of the Republic of the
19 Serb Krajina, the government, this committee, and all these other organs,
20 because there had to be frequent communication. Also there was daily
21 communication with different representatives. Knin and Krajina were full
22 of these international representatives. You could not walk down the
23 street without bumping into one of them.
24 Q. It says here at point 6 that:
25 “The RSK requests a definitive answer to the question whether the
Page 12453
1 Vance Plan is still in existence. As far as we are concerned, it is
2 still a legally valid document, regardless of the resolutions adopted
3 subsequently.”
4 Do you remember what lay behind this question? Why was this
5 question posed, whether the Vance Plan is still in existence?
6 A. The Serbs from the Republic of Serb Krajina had difficulty in
7 accepting the Vance Plan. There were divided views on this. Finally the
8 Vance Plan was signed because it did not prejudge a political solution of
9 the conflict. However, when the Vance Plan was accepted, when UNPROFOR
10 arrived, things became troublesome for the Serbs. Aggressions of the
11 Croat army started. We mentioned some of them today: Nos Kalik in
12 March when UNPROFOR was being deployed, and then we also mentioned the
13 Miljevac Plateau in June, and then Maslenica in 1993, in January. It
14 seems to me that the Security Council would pass a resolution for each
15 and every one of these occurrences, and these resolutions somewhat
16 deviated from the Vance Plan. It became obvious that this political
17 solution was being prejudged in a way and that they were returning us to
18 the Croatian state.
19 And that is why –
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, Mr. Witness, I am convinced and very
21 sure that the interpreters can't follow you properly. You are speaking
22 way too fast. So please slow down.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, they're not complaining.
24 MR. GOSNELL: Might be time for the –
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: I beg your pardon?
Page 12454
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, now I've lost my train of
2 thought, it seems …
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: I think that last intervention of you,
4 Mr. Strbac, is totally inappropriate. I asked you to slow down. So
5 please slow down.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Okay.
7 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I see the time.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: And I indeed see the time.
9 We'll take our first break, 30 minutes — or the second break,
10 sorry, 30 minutes, Mr. Witness, and we'll be back at 12.45.
11 Court adjourned.
12 — Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 — On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Please proceed, Mr. Gosnell.
17 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Q. Mr. Strbac, just before the break, you were referring to
19 “Security Council resolutions that deviated from the Vance Plan in a way
20 that they were returning us to the Croatian state.”
21 Now just very specifically, can you recall what measures being
22 adopted by the Security Council were raising doubts as to whether the
23 Vance Plan was still applicable?
24 A. Well, for example, as far as I can remember, after the Maslenica
25 operation, a resolution was passed according to which the Croats were
Page 12455
1 supposed to withdraw, the Croatian forces were supposed to withdraw from
2 the area that had been taken. The Serbs were supposed to return weapons
3 into the arms depots under this double lock, double key. The Serbs did
4 not return their weapons as the Croats did not withdraw. It seems to me
5 that some other resolutions were also passed which refer to some customs
6 law or something like that, namely, that all exports and imports should
7 go through Croatia for the Republic of the Serb Krajina, which was
8 mind-boggling, especially at a time of war and when hostilities had
9 peaked.
10 So people came from these international organisations, they
11 talked to us about how within Croatia we would have autonomy like, I
12 don't know, southern Tyrol in Italy and then the Aland Islands in
13 Finland. They took our people to seminars in different places in the
14 world. So all this implied we should go back to Croatia, whereas we were
15 staying that political issues had to be resolved, that the Vance Plan did
16 not prejudge any political solution, and the Croats were not exactly in
17 favour of the Vance Plan.
18 MR. GOSNELL: May we have 01594, Defence tab 77, please.
19 Q. Unfortunately, we only have this document, Mr. Strbac, in English
20 uploaded, but it is an outgoing cable from Wahlgren to Annan dated the
21 19th of April, 1993. So approximately a month before the memorandum of
22 your meeting with Mr. Stoltenberg. And the subject line reads:
23 “Consequences for our mandate in Croatia of recent Security Council
24 resolution on sanctions meeting with prime minister designate Bjegovic of
25 the RSK.”
Page 12456
1 Can I first ask you, do you recall hearing about any meetings
2 from Mr. Bjegovic that he may have had with Mr. Wahlgren around this
3 time?
4 A. I heard that he held meetings with UNPROFOR and all other
5 representatives of international organisations as prime minister
6 designate, and he talked to them as he talked to me when he was trying to
7 talk me into joining his government as secretary or some minister. I did
8 not want to be a minister. I heard about this type of discussion,
9 namely, that we would join this government, take over this government,
10 and create a normal state, but that that is impossible if the
11 representatives of international organisations are not on our side.
12 Q. And this document says at point 1:
13 “We are increasingly concerned over the disparity between actions
14 being taken in New York and realities on the ground. We find — we had
15 already expressed our grave concern with regard to paragraph 12 of the
16 new Sanctions resolution … in the hope of averting a major setback to
17 our mandate in Croatia.”
18 MR. GOSNELL: And then, please, if we could turn over to page 3.
19 Q. At the bottom of paragraph 6, after referring to some
20 resolutions, it says:
21 “The new resolution made it clear that the basic tenets of the
22 Vance Plan were being brushed aside. This was a further step to impose
23 Croatian authority on them.”
24 And at the bottom the very last sentence on this page:
25 “Does the Vance Plan still exist? We do not know, nor do we know
Page 12457
1 by what it has been replaced, except a lot of anti-Serb huffing and
2 puffing which damages us much more than them.”
3 Did you hear from Mr. Bjegovic whether he heard from any UNPROFOR
4 officials whether they were in doubt as to whether the Vance Plan was
5 still in effect?
6 A. I cannot remember right now. I cannot give just a yes or no
7 answer to this. But I think that I have responded earlier on when I said
8 that Bjegovic was saying that he had meetings as prime minister designate
9 with all the representatives, all representatives of all international
10 organisations, and that the basic topic of discussion with all of them
11 was precisely the Vance Plan.
12 You must understand that throughout Krajina there was an UNPROFOR
13 presence, inkblots, and I already said that we Serbs found it hard to
14 accept but –
15 Q. Sorry for cutting you off, Mr. Strbac, but I just want to try to
16 refocus you back on my question, if I may, and proceed in this way. How
17 did Mr. Stoltenberg respond when the — when the issue was raised of
18 whether the Vance Plan was still in effect during your meeting in
19 May with him?
20 A. As far as I can remember, they didn't know either, whether this
21 plan was in existence or not. And I assumed that that is why they wrote
22 such letters, that they were not sending to us. They were sending these
23 letters to their superiors in New York and wherever because they
24 themselves were perplexed over the situation on the ground. We have the
25 Vance Plan that we accepted. We have peacekeeping forces on the ground
Page 12458
1 and something else is being decided in New York. We can all see, they
2 can see, we can see, under our pressure, that they are asking their
3 superiors, they're asking the Security Council to respond and say what's
4 going on. Does the Vance Plan still exist? How should they behave on
5 the ground? They don't know, and how could we know then?
6 MR. GOSNELL: May I tender this document, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Admitted and marked.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D245, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 MR. GOSNELL:
11 Q. Now, at paragraph 63 of your statement, you described meeting
12 with Mr. Bjegovic and being offered and taking the position of secretary
13 of the RSK government.
14 Can you ask you, first of all, to describe briefly, if you can,
15 your duties as secretary of the government?
16 A. First of all, the secretary of the government is not a member of
17 the government. It is ministers who are members of the government, as
18 well as the prime minister. So I was there in a technical capacity.
19 That meant that I had a few people there in the secretariat, I also had a
20 deputy, I also had various clerks. And we were supposed to prepare
21 government meetings and we were supposed to record government meetings,
22 write up all the decisions that were reached at meetings of the
23 government. We did not transcribe meetings at the time. We just wrote
24 up brief conclusions from the taped material and that would become part
25 of the record that would be approved at the following session if there
Page 12459
1 were no objections.
2 So all of this material, all these decisions, would be submitted
3 to the Official Gazette as well because, for the most part, they were
4 published in the Official Gazette. All the ministries provided us with
5 material for government sessions and we would then include in the agenda
6 things that were submitted to us by the ministries. That would be it in
7 the briefest possible terms.
8 I was secretary of the government and also the president of the
9 government commission for the exchange of prisoners and mortal remains.
10 I did that before I became secretary of the government. Once I became
11 secretary of the government, I established a commission for the entire
12 Republic of the Serb Krajina. Before that there were different
13 commissions at municipal, local levels, regional and so on, military,
14 civilian, et cetera. Once I became secretary of the government, I
15 managed to establish a single commission for the entire Republic of the
16 Serb Krajina. Soon I also founded an NGO, Veritas, and –
17 Q. Yes, and that's — and those subjects are covered in your
18 statement, Mr. Strbac, so I won't go into all of those. But I would like
19 to ask you how frequent were your contacts as the secretary of the
20 government with Prime Minister Bjegovic and the other ministers?
21 A. The prime minister mostly because our offices were right next
22 door to each other. So my people did all the work that was required by
23 the prime minister, my people from the secretariat. He just had one lady
24 who was his secretary and I wasn't her boss. All the rest was done by my
25 people. We worked for the prime minister. I've already said that these
Page 12460
1 were contacts or, rather, preparations. And after all, there was a state
2 of war there, and we were constantly in session so there were no special
3 working hours. We worked day and night. Our people went out into the
4 field, but we communicated, we talked a great deal. We were close, he
5 and I, because I had other prime ministers that I was not that close to,
6 but I was close to him and we shared a lot. Perhaps some things that one
7 would not exactly expect between a prime minister and the secretary of
8 the government, who was, after all, not an elected official.
9 Q. And after you assumed the position of secretary of the
10 government, what percentage of government sessions did you attend, would
11 you say?
12 A. Well, it was a rare session that I did not attend. I remember
13 several times it was more important for me to go to exchanges of
14 prisoners. That could be the only reason why I didn't go to a meeting,
15 to a government session. When exchanges had already been agreed with the
16 Croatian side, not only with Bjegovic but others too, because I remained,
17 until the very fall of Krajina, that would be the only times that I
18 didn't attend the government sessions.
19 Q. And how were judicial appointments made in the RSK?
20 A. Well, we had the regular way, when there was no imminent threat
21 of war and no state of war was declared, appointments were made by the
22 assembly. And during the imminent threat of war and the state of war, I
23 remember but I also refreshed my memory with some documents, the
24 president of the republic exercising his constitutional powers, because
25 in times of the state of war or imminent threat of war, he assumed the
Page 12461
1 powers of the parliament and transferred them to the government. So
2 while I was secretary of the government, I remember that the government
3 appointed judges and prosecutors but that was when a state of imminent
4 threat of war or state of war was declared. That is to say, after the
5 Maslenica operation.
6 MR. GOSNELL: May we have P3093, please. Defence tab 67.
7 Q. And before that comes up, did that method of appointment that
8 you've just described apply to all judicial positions?
9 A. Yes. Yes, as far as I remember.
10 MR. GOSNELL: The number again is P3093.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MR. GOSNELL:
13 Q. Now these appear to be the minutes from the –
14 A. 16.
15 Q. — government session of the 16th of September, 1993, in Knin.
16 And if we go over now to the very last page of this document, whose is
17 the last name there on that attendance list?
18 A. It's my name. Number 17.
19 MR. GOSNELL: And if we could back, please, one page in both
20 documents.
21 Q. There are a series of decisions on the appointment of judge,
22 jurors at the Vukovar Supreme Court, on the appointment of a judge at the
23 Knin Municipal Court, of a judge of the Knin District Court, relieving
24 the president of the Okucani Municipal Court, and an appointment of the
25 judge at the Slunj Municipal Court.
Page 12462
1 How were the appointees decided upon, if you know?
2 A. The proposal came from the competent ministry, in this case, the
3 Ministry of Justice, and the government decided, based on the
4 presidential decree from sometime in January, and the president
5 transferred his own powers and the powers of the assembly to the
6 government. This government session took place while the Medak pocket
7 operation was still under way.
8 It was always the competent ministries that suggested
9 appointments within their field of work, but the government had to
10 formally approve it at their sessions.
11 Q. Now, at paragraph 66 of your statement, you say:
12 “As far as I know, Goran Hadzic hardly ever came to Knin during
13 the time that I was secretary of the government. During my tenure as
14 secretary, he perhaps came to Knin three times, and he never attended any
15 government session, nor was he expected to under the constitution or for
16 any other reason.”
17 I'd like to ask you now generally what role, in practice, based
18 on your direct observation or any conversations with the prime minister
19 or other ministers, what role did Mr. Hadzic have in government
20 decisions?
21 A. Well, as far as I remember, none. I came in end April 1993, and
22 in January he already left his position as president, so it was a very
23 brief period that we coincided, but I don't remember that any materials
24 came from the president in preparation for government sessions. It says
25 here in this paragraph that there was a proposal to dismiss certain
Page 12463
1 ministers, and perhaps that's the only time when a proposal by
2 President Hadzic was discussed at government sessions.
3 Q. To your knowledge, were ministers giving any reports to
4 President Hadzic?
5 A. I don't know that. I'm certain that it was not done through the
6 secretary of the government or the secretariat. They may have had
7 another channel along military lines or different lines, but whether they
8 used it, I don't know.
9 Q. You've described having a close relationship with Prime Minister
10 Bjegovic. Did he tell you that he reported to President Hadzic?
11 A. Again, I have to say that he did not, through the secretariat or
12 the secretary of the government. I don't know if he had a personal
13 communication with him, he never told me about it. And government
14 sessions discussed more than once, especially during the state of war and
15 the aggression by Croatia, that the president, the head of state, should
16 appear in Knin where all the authorities were, except for the
17 Supreme Court. Only the president and the Supreme Court were in the
18 eastern part, in Vukovar. All the other state bodies were in Knin, and
19 it was logical for the president to come where all the others were. It
20 was a time when the Medak pocket operation and Maslenica operation were
21 still going on.
22 But he didn't show up at government sessions, and it was never
23 written anywhere that he had to. I believe there are even some minutes
24 and documents where I saw that Prime Minister Bjegovic said that six
25 different invitations had been sent to him and the president always said
Page 12464
1 that he could not come because of something that was going on in
2 Banja Luka.
3 To be quite clear, from Vukovar to Knin, he could not travel
4 across RSK territory because the eastern part where he worked and lived
5 was physically cut off from the western part, from Knin, and since he
6 didn't dare travel through Croatia, he could only travel part of the way
7 through Serbia and part of the way through Republika Srpska. At the time
8 of the Medak pocket operation, there was some sort of insurgency in
9 Republika Srpska and almost as if it had been agreed with the Croats, it
10 coincided with the Medak pocket action. It started on the same day and
11 ended on the same day. Both of them began on the 9th of September and
12 ended on the 17th.
13 Q. Mr. Strbac, since you've raised it I'll ask you about the six
14 invitations that you just described to President Hadzic by Prime Minister
15 Bjegovic. Were those invitations all in respect of something particular
16 and over what time-period were those invitations made?
17 A. Since this Bjegovic government came after the Maslenica operation
18 and the Medak pocket and that event that required the president to be
19 with the other organs in Knin, that is the Medak pocket operation of the
20 9th of September, and I believe those invitations were during the state
21 of war. From 9 to 17th September was this operation and it lasted
22 exactly the same time as the Serbian insurgency. Several hundreds troops
23 and officers with tanks blocked all access roads to Banja Luka, and
24 Hadzic, as the head of state, since this insurgency was a rebellion
25 against the corruption in the leadership of Republika Srpska, they were
Page 12465
1 not able to pass too, and Hadzic was not allowed to pass because people
2 made some connection between him and the leadership of Republika Srpska,
3 probably because of his very office.
4 MR. GOSNELL: Let's please turn back to page 2 of the English in
5 this document. And in B/C/S it may be page 2. Perhaps we could just
6 turn back to the previous page in the B/C/S. Sorry, we did need page 2,
7 after all. Thank you.
8 Q. Now just at the top the page there in B/C/S and in English in the
9 second paragraph, there's a — some words attributed to Prime Minister
10 Bjegovic, he describes what is happening around Divoselo.
11 Is Divoselo related to the Medak pocket operation that you've
12 been describing?
13 A. The Medak pocket operation targeted three villages, and one of
14 them is Divoselo. Among the Serbian people, Divoselo is held as a symbol
15 of suffering, both in the Second World War and in the last war, and many
16 people, instead of referring to the Medak pocket, they say Divoselo.
17 Q. And it goes on to say:
18 “As for the conclusions from the session held on 13 September, it
19 is my duty to inform you that letters have been sent to the prime
20 ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro.
21 We sent President Hadzic six invitations to appear in Knin, but he
22 replied that could not come due to the situation in Banja Luka.”
23 Does that correspond to what you were describing earlier about
24 Mr. Hadzic being blocked at Banja Luka?
25 A. Precisely. Precisely. Nobody could pass through during those
Page 12466
1 days. Banja Luka was surrounded by tanks, not enemy tanks but Serb
2 tanks. It was a rather notorious mutiny of Serb troops and officers who
3 were angry about the corruption and the crime, from 9 to 17 September,
4 that is to say, the same period as the Medak pocket, and there was
5 absolutely no chance for anybody to pass through, especially not the
6 president of the Serbian Krajina.
7 MR. GOSNELL: May we have P1914, please, which is Defence tab 58.
8 Q. Now, these are the minutes of the 44th RSK government session
9 dated 4th of May, 1993.
10 MR. GOSNELL: May we please turn to the last page.
11 Q. Whose signature, if you can read it, appears at number 18?
12 A. It's my signature. You can see very well, Savo Strbac, and my
13 signature. It's under number 18.
14 MR. GOSNELL: And if we could please go back to page 6 of the
15 English and page 3 of the B/C/S. I apologise, we'll have to go back to
16 page 3 of the English. And it should be page 4 or 5 of the B/C/S. Just
17 under item 1. Yes, we'll have to go back one more page, I think, in the
18 B/C/S. I'm afraid it must be back further.
19 Well, to make this easy, let's go back right to the beginning
20 page.
21 Q. Now here we have a set of agenda items, Mr. Strbac. Can I first
22 ask you, just reviewing this — these agenda items, do they fall within
23 the purview of the government's responsibility as you understood it and
24 as you observed it?
25 A. All this falls within the agenda and the purview of the
Page 12467
1 government. Not all of this is about making decisions. One part are
2 decisions but there are briefings and all sorts of reports and
3 information. The government can always deliberate on various issues and
4 take up positions. It's different when decrees and decisions are made.
5 This we see under number 3. All this fell within the purview of the
6 government, as far as I can see.
7 MR. GOSNELL: May we just go back one page in English because
8 it's not showing agenda item 1. Or perhaps scroll up. Yes.
9 Agenda item 1, discussing documents relating to resolving the
10 relations with the Presidency of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro. And
11 then if we turn to the page and go to the very bottom of the second page
12 in English, we see there – very bottom – a heading saying: “Item 1.”
13 And then if we can turn the page in English one more, that's
14 where I'd like to stay for a moment. In B/C/S, if we can go forward to
15 the next page. There it is.
16 Q. Now, am I correct that this initial discussion which you see in
17 front of you concerns item 1, discussing documents relating to resolving
18 relations with the Presidency of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro?
19 A. You're right.
20 MR. GOSNELL: Now, if we can just go to the end of this section,
21 which is page 6 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S.
22 Q. Now this appears at the bottom of the discussion by the members
23 of the government and there's a decision. And the decision says:
24 “Prepare a cover letter for these topics, which would have to be
25 signed by President Hadzic.”
Page 12468
1 Now, can you explain why it is that the government is asking –
2 on what basis is the government asking for this letter to be signed by
3 President Hadzic?
4 A. Because the letter is sent out to other states, and a state is
5 internationally represented by the head of state, not the head of
6 government. This is not an order to the president that he has to sign
7 something. It's simply his constitutional responsibility to read the
8 document and sign it. If he believes — if he finds that he shouldn't
9 sign it, he will not.
10 Q. Do you remember what constitutional provision is relevant here?
11 A. If I can think of it off the cuff, I believe it would be
12 Article 78, para 1, item 3. I'm speaking off the top of my head, but it
13 must be easy to check the documents.
14 MR. GOSNELL: May we have L3. Defence tab 65, page 23 of the
15 English, and page 7 of the B/C/S. Now I am afraid –
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was wrong. It's item 4. But it
17 is, indeed, Article 78, paragraph 1. Item 4.
18 MR. GOSNELL:
19 Q. So is it your understanding that it was on that basis that
20 Mr. Hadzic was asked to sign the letter?
21 A. Only that.
22 MR. GOSNELL: May we have P3803, please, which is Defence tab 59.
23 MR. GILLETT: I wonder if my learned friend means 3083, tab 59.
24 MR. GOSNELL: That is quite right. I thank my friend.
25 Q. Now this is another set of minutes of the government of the RSK,
Page 12469
1 Mr. Strbac. This is the 46th Session held in Knin on the 13th of May,
2 1993.
3 MR. GOSNELL: If we could turn, please, now to page 23 of the
4 English and page 11 of the B/C/S.
5 Q. This section reads:
6 “Before reading out the government's standpoint on an all-Serbian
7 Assembly, Prime Minister Bjegovic stated that no one from the Republic of
8 Serbia had issued an official order to have goods from the RSK sent back
9 from the border.”
10 Do you see that?
11 A. Yes, 12, yes.
12 MR. GOSNELL: Now if we turn, please, to page 25 in the English
13 and it should be the next page in B/C/S.
14 Q. “Conclusion,” and this follows the discussion by various
15 ministers, including Martic, Kuzet, Arbutina, and so forth. The
16 conclusion is:
17 “The final text of the RSK government standpoint on an
18 all-Serbian Assembly shall be drafted by the RSK Ministry of Justice and
19 Administration.”
20 Now given Article 78, 4, which is supposed to confer authority on
21 the president to carry out duties regarding relations with other
22 countries, why is this being taken up by the government without any
23 apparent reference to the authority of the president of the RSK?
24 A. Well, there can be several reasons. First of all, this is the
25 position of the government, not a decision by the government. A position
Page 12470
1 can be taken by the parliament, by the head of state. The question is
2 now who makes the final decision, but at any rate, the government can
3 take positions on all matters, including this all-Serbian Assembly.
4 Secondly, the president wasn't really asked a lot about things
5 like this.
6 MR. GOSNELL: Now I'm done with this document. Thank you.
7 Q. Now, at paragraph 66 of your statement, and you've already
8 referred to this previously in your testimony, concerning the issue of
9 the president's power to remove government ministers, and you say:
10 “I believe that could only be done on the order of the prime
11 minister upon a vote of the RSK Assembly.”
12 Do you remember whether there was any constitutional provision
13 applicable to the removal of ministers?
14 A. In the article that we looked at, Article 78 of the constitution,
15 there is some reference to the powers of the head of state when there is
16 an imminent threat of war and when a state of war is declared. As far as
17 I can remember, what is written there is that in that situation, the
18 president can also change the powers and composition of all institutions
19 in the state, including the government; therefore, ministers included.
20 That was my understanding of it.
21 MR. GOSNELL: Well, let's have a look at L3, please, again;
22 page 27 in the English and this should be page 8 in the B/C/S. And we're
23 looking for Article 87.
24 Q. It says that:
25 “The president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina can propose the
Page 12471
1 dismissal of some of the members of the government.”
2 Does that jog your memory as to the nature of the president's
3 power in relation to removing ministers?
4 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, the witness gave an answer as to
5 which powers he thought the president could remove ministers under and
6 the reference to this article has clearly been used in a leading way, in
7 fact, the Defence counsel expressly said: “Does this jog your memory.”
8 So I just note for the record that this was framed in a leading way.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's on the record.
10 MR. GOSNELL:
11 Q. Did you hear my question, Mr. Strbac?
12 A. Yes. There are two situations.
13 One is when it happens in peacetime and I think that this
14 pertains to peacetime, 87; whereas Article 88, some paragraph there,
15 speaks of the powers of the president when an imminent threat of war is
16 declared or a state of war. That is the only way in which I can
17 interpret that.
18 Q. And otherwise the removal of ministers is governed by that
19 provision in front of you; correct? In Article 87?
20 A. Yes, in peacetime.
21 MR. GOSNELL: And if we go back, please, to page 19 of this
22 document and page 6 of the B/C/S, item 10.
23 Q. Does that have any relevance to the issue?
24 A. Well, yes. It says here elects and — it has to do with
25 peacetime, yes, the assembly.
Page 12472
1 MR. GOSNELL: If we go, please, to page 27 of this document,
2 which, again, Article 87, and it's B/C/S page 8.
3 Q. The very first line reads:
4 “The government and every member of it are responsible for their
5 work to the president of the republic and the assembly.”
6 Now, did this provision reflect the reality in respect of the
7 president? Were the members of the government responsible for their work
8 to the president of the republic?
9 A. While I was in the government, I would not say — well, we had
10 this one situation that we discussed. There was this proposal concerning
11 the state of war or imminent threat of war. That was in the immediate
12 aftermath of the Medak pocket and then in 1993 when the president
13 withdrew that proposal of his.
14 As for these other peacetime situations, between these different
15 actions that called for a state of war, I don't think that, in practice,
16 he interfered with the work of the government.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 MR. GOSNELL: May we turn to page 23 of the document; page 7 of
19 the B/C/S.
20 Q. This is under Article 78, under the president of the Republic of
21 Serbian Krajina, and item 7 reads:
22 “Under his initiative or under the government's proposal, during
23 the state of war or immediate threat of war, adopts acts about issues
24 from the assembly's jurisdiction and is required to submit them before
25 the assembly as soon as the assembly is able to meet.”
Page 12473
1 Do you remember that provision, Mr. Strbac?
2 A. I do. I mean, that is a provision that is studied even in law
3 school. I'm a lawyer myself. It's nothing new. It's nothing special,
4 just from the constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Every
5 country has that in its constitution.
6 Q. And was that provision applied in practice in 1993, to your
7 knowledge?
8 A. I do not recall that the president used this right, except for
9 that one attempt that I referred to, that is part of the record of one
10 government session, that could be considered as being under this article,
11 when he did not agree to have two ministers replaced.
12 Q. I'm not sure I understand your answer, Mr. Strbac, because you
13 refer to this being as a right that appears to be conferred on the
14 president whereas this provision is referring to a requirement, obliging
15 him to submit acts to the assembly as soon as the assembly is able to
16 meet; isn't that right?
17 MR. GILLETT: Your Honours, this sounds –
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.
19 MR. GILLETT: — more like cross-examination than direct
20 examination. Quoting from the provision and attempting to force the
21 witness to agree with that is purely leading. So, again, I'd put that on
22 the record. The answer is now out but I would put that on the record.
23 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I recall what you said the other
24 day, that during the Defence case, it certainly ought to be within our
25 latitude to present matters that are at the core of the Prosecution's
Page 12474
1 case to witnesses to hear their comment. I really don't know how else to
2 present an issue for the witness's comment other than the manner in which
3 I did it. I do regret having used that rather forceful, those forceful
4 words at the end, but the witness's answer was ambiguous, and I think it
5 was legitimate to seek a clarification.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: You may proceed.
7 MR. GOSNELL:
8 Q. Now before you were cut off, you said: “Absolutely.”
9 Did you wish to say anything further, Mr. Strbac?
10 A. This is what my answer would be: Well, what is written here is
11 quite clear, what this provision says, that is. I said that as far as I
12 can remember, the president, President Hadzic did not use these powers
13 except in one particular situation. However, since these persons were
14 not replaced, then it wasn't necessary for him to turn to the assembly
15 and to ask for approval. That is it, to the best of my recollection.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. GOSNELL: I'm done with this document.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Strbac, at paragraph 55 of your statement, you
19 describe — and surrounding paragraphs, you describe the process for
20 authorising the departure of civilians from the area of the RSK, and you
21 say there that:
22 “The process was more or less modelled on exchange of prisoners
23 in the sense that EUMM, UNPROFOR, UNCIVPOL, and/or the Red Cross were
24 always involved in these movements.”
25 Now can I ask you, did they encourage contacts with the –
Page 12475
1 between the two sides on this issue?
2 A. Well, the answer would be yes. All these international
3 organisations cared a lot about the protection of human rights, the
4 protection of human lives on all sides. Since I was in charge of this
5 commission of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for exchanges of the living
6 and dead, sometimes we called it the commission for humanitarian issues,
7 sometimes for the exchange of prisoners, I had daily communication with
8 all of them. Sometimes even several times a day with the same people. I
9 helped people get the necessary permits as I used or abused the powers
10 that I had as secretary of the government so that I could reach all the
11 state organs. It was easier for me that way than if I did — had not
12 held that position. So, you see, it wasn't that easy to — to cross the
13 line of separation or the front line, whatever you wish to call it.
14 Always certain permits had to be obtained regardless of who it was that
15 was carrying out the exchange.
16 Q. Now what criteria did you apply, if any, for determining whether
17 someone should be given the necessary permits?
18 A. Well, the first and basic thing was that people would make these
19 communications. My colleague, Mr. Kuzetic [phoen] and I used to have a
20 law office before the war together, and when there was no communication
21 between Croatia and the Krajina except through sights on weapons, as
22 people say, we had this communication and we were helped by the
23 international organisations, and we used their communications with the
24 other side. And when somebody would come to us, for example, a Croat,
25 and if he'd say that he is afraid, that he feels insecure, that he is
Page 12476
1 receiving threats, that he has relatives on the other side, sons, anybody
2 that he wished to cross over, then we would try to grants their wishes.
3 Again, there were some objective situations like, say,
4 Miljevac Plateau, not to mention everything that happened. There were
5 many, many Serb refugees from Croatia. And there was this objective
6 danger looming over Croats because people had come from the other side
7 and then people would reach agreements amongst themselves. They would
8 say: Well, why don't you give me the property that you left behind, and
9 I will take over your property here. And then we tried to let this
10 happen. And then there were people who wanted to cross to the Serb side.
11 Just like Croats in the Krajina, Serbs in Croatia felt threatened. So
12 that's why I'm saying that all of this happened on the basis of a system
13 for exchange of prisoners.
14 It's not that we ever handed over anything to the Croats without
15 asking for something in return because objectively this happened on both
16 sides. There wasn't any major difference. I can tell that you, in 1993,
17 there were 130.000 refugees registered, those who had fled from
18 Croatian-controlled territory. That perhaps doesn't sound like a lot,
19 but if all of Krajina had a population of about 400.000, that — then
20 that is a lot.
21 Q. Were there any — were there any time-periods when departures
22 were more frequent or more numerous than others?
23 A. Yes, yes. After these operations, we were saying that in the
24 Maslenica operation about 10.000 Serbs were expelled. They came to the
25 municipality of Benkovac and Knin, and there were still quite a few mixed
Page 12477
1 villages there, Croat/Serb. Then people went there on their own and they
2 were trying to find places where they could stay.
3 At that time, since this is in my area where I lived, the
4 municipality of Benkovac, Maslenica actually included my municipality as
5 well, so I know a lot of these people who were fleeing from their
6 villages. And for this Crisis Staff of Benkovac where I worked, we
7 managed to find accommodation for some people in places that were
8 collective centres, like the elementary school and other places. There
9 weren't very many such locations. Others were staying in the villages.
10 They were milling about. It was hard to keep masses of people under
11 control because 10.000 people is a lot, their families, and once they
12 would get to a village, then — well, the Croats would say: Well, I'm
13 not under threat now, but I see how many of them keep coming in, and
14 somebody is going to come tomorrow or the day after tomorrow and ask me
15 to leave and it's better for me to leave now rather than lose my property
16 and lose my life.
17 Q. Did you try to encourage these people to stay where they resided
18 at the time?
19 A. As much as possible, we were saying this will not go on for a
20 long time, this is temporary. However, people knew best what they felt
21 and how they felt. They would say to us that they wanted to leave until
22 all of this blows over. We were encouraging others, saying that all of
23 this was temporary, that it was important to save people's lives, and
24 that property can be resolved easily.
25 MR. GOSNELL: May we have 1D3786, please, which is Defence
Page 12478
1 tab 75.
2 Q. How would you characterise the nature of your relationship with
3 your counterparts on the Croatian side in this enterprise of facilitating
4 departures of civilians, from each side to the other?
5 A. I wrote about that and spoke about that in public over the years.
6 We who were involved in these humanitarian affairs could just take
7 people's word for it, and they could just take my word for it. We did
8 not sign any documents, and, if we did, it happened very seldom. Because
9 there was the problem of state recognition. For instance, I would like
10 every document to say that I am a representative of the Republic of the
11 Serb Krajina, and the Croats would say: Well, we don't recognise that
12 state, and then there would be a problem. Well, then we took everybody's
13 word for it. Recognition is a formality but let us get the job done.
14 Let these people get out of prison. Let us get the deceased to their
15 families so that they can bury them properly. As for those who wished to
16 leave, well, they were saying that they wanted to save their lives so
17 they should leave on time. And once the war is over – we all knew that
18 one day the war would be over – then they should return to their property
19 alive.
20 Q. Now at paragraph 47, you're talking about prisoner exchanges, not
21 civilian departures, and you describe there the difference between a
22 one-for-one system of exchange and other grounds for exchange. And is it
23 true that the one-for-one exchange system was applied for prisoners of
24 war, or combatants?
25 A. We had two rules. One was one for one; and the other one was all
Page 12479
1 for all.
2 When everybody agreed to all for all, again, it would boil down
3 to one for one. Because the other side was always asked for more than
4 what the other side had admitted to having. They were asking, say, for
5 people who were no longer among the living or who went abroad and so on.
6 So it would always be that number. We'd always have to compile lists in
7 advance. Regardless of what we call the principle, we would have to
8 compile a list of these persons who would be exchanged, and an exchange
9 would hardly ever take place if everybody was not present, unless there
10 was a very strong reason for someone not being there. If one proceeds
11 from that principle, one for one, then what I described in my statement
12 would happen. Namely, at first, in 1991, 1992, and even in 1993, the
13 Serbs always had more Croat soldiers in their prisons than the Croats had
14 Serbs, so then when you say one for one, then Croats would start
15 arresting civilians and then they'd bring them to the exchange and they'd
16 say: Well, there you go, one for one. That's why I was against that.
17 Then civilians would get arrested and they would show up there as
18 prisoners to be exchanged for soldiers.
19 MR. GOSNELL: Mr. President, I thought I would have had time to
20 complete the document, but perhaps it would be best to finish it
21 tomorrow, with your leave.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay, Mr. Gosnell.
23 Mr. Strbac, this is — 2.00 is the end of the — today's hearing.
24 We expect you to be back at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
25 In the meantime, you remain a witness and you remain under oath.
Page 12480
1 In this system, this means that you are not allowed to speak with anybody
2 about your testimony, not even to your family back home, and also that
3 you are not allowed to have contact with any of the parties, as long as
4 you are under oath and on the witness stand.
5 Do you understand?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
8 Court adjourned.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 — Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.00 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day of
12 October, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.
13
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